

GULICK: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE CHANGE

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In a very few cases of total incapacitation, individuals have had to be placed in public institutions for care. Otherwise, the village takes care of its own unfortunates, in conformance with the traditional attitudes of self-sufficiency. A unit of the Lebanese Red Cross visits the village at regular intervals to provide medical care for those who need it, but have been unable or unwilling to go to a doctor in the city. There is a regular, and entirely traditional, mechanism for caring for families who get into financial straits. A close friend of the family, who has learned of the situation because of his closeness, goes to each household in the village saying, "There is among us a family in need. I am going to give them some money; how much are you willing to give?" It is very bad form to ask for whom the collection is being made, and a contribution which is offered under such conditions may be refused by the collector. The strict anonymity which accompanies this behavior suggests that even in such a tight in-group as the village keeping up appearances is a conscious value. Clique and lineage rivalries undoubtedly contribute to this.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONS

Everyone in the village, except for a handful among the very old, are literate. A quite respectable number have received or are receiving college educations. The significance of education in the village will be discussed in the next chapter; here it is appropriate to consider only the bearing which education has on occupations.

Literacy itself is no rarity in Lebanon. In fact, among the Christians, at least, we can safely say that it is the expected thing. Mere literacy alone would raise one's aspirations only above that of manual laborer, in the city. For professional status or for governmental positions college educations are prerequisite. Medicine and the law require additional training beyond college which no one in Munzif has recently undertaken. The number of positions open to ordinary college graduates which are in line with the individual's ambitions (befitting a learned and cultured person) are rather limited in Lebanon, and many such persons must be satisfied with whatever they can find. In consequence, a certain restlessness and dissatisfaction is to be found among those who have had advanced education.

AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS

Munzif depends, and has always depended, upon crops which do not require rain or irrigation in the growing season. In order, the most important are olives, figs and grapes. Of these the major cash crop is olives. This has not always been true. Up to 1914 the major cash crop in the village, and in Lebanon as a whole, was the silkworm cocoon, fed on mulberry leaves. Sericulture has not died out completely in Lebanon, and it is still fairly strong in the Kisrawan, Kura, Meten, and Shunf districts (Févet, 1949b, p. 249), but it has long since lost its economic

prevalence.

TABLE 8. LINEAGE DEVELOPMENT AND NUMBER OF MALES,
ACCORDING TO GENEOLOGICAL GENERATION

GENERATION:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
		A-1	1	2	I-1	1	1	1	1	1	3	4	1
						II-1	1	2	3	6	3		
				III-1	1	1	3	3	4	13	19	6	
					IV-1	1	2	3	5	6	7		
						V-1	3	6	14	3			
						VI-1	2	5	5				
						VII-1	5	8	10	4			
						VIII-1	4	11	24	21	12		
					1	IX-1	4	2	3	4	5		
					X-1	2	2	4	8	12	8	4	
							XI-1	4	7	7	1	4	
		B-1	1	4	XII-1	1	1	1	1	2	2		
					1	3	5	3	5	7			
					XIII-1	1	2	3	11	7	5		
1							Dec-1	5	13	9	1		
							Dec-1	2	4	6	6		
							Dec-1	1	2	2			
							Dec-1	3	6	8	7	6	
					XIV-1	3	5	8	9	11			
					XV-1	1	6	5	10	1			
		C-1	2	2	(XVI)-3	2	7	12	16	15			
						XVII-1	2	2	3	5			
							XVIII-1	1	2	2	3		
							XIX-1	1	2	6	3	2	1
				XX-1	1	1	2	1	2	4	11	17	
					XXI-1	2	1	2	3	8	11	12	
							Dec-1	2	5	2			
NUMBER OF LINEAGES:				2	11	7	5						

ported. If a feud, or some other crisis calling for group loyalty, occurred, quite possibly loyalty lines would, minimally, follow lineage lines. In this connection, one informant said with evident pride that there were never any feuds in the village. The writer has no evidence that the present behavior associated with the lineages represents any recent change, with the exception of a possible change in marriage patterns which will be discussed later.

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morphic monotheism among the Jews was in part due to their solidification as an ethnic in-group after the Babylonian exile. (Witness, for example, the statement: "Thus I cleansed them from everything foreign. . ." Nehemiah 13:30). Moving forward in date, we are told that in the Arabian centers at the time of Muhammad,

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The group-bond was stronger than the bond of citizenship, and feuds between group and group often divided a town against itself (Robertson Smith, 1885, p. 2).

And at a later period, we find that the Ottoman Empire

was composed of a large number of groups, local, tribal, linguistic and religious. On the whole, these groups formed closed communities. Each was a "world," sufficient to its members and exacting their ultimate loyalty. The worlds touched but did not mingle with each other; each looked at the rest with suspicion and even hatred. Almost all were stagnant, unchanging and limited. (Hourani, 1947, p. 22.)

And the following brings us to the present situation, of which it emphasizes the regional aspect:

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And so there grew up in the Arab world as we know it: an association of peoples, who are vividly conscious of a network of traditions, interests, feelings and sympathies that unite them, but who live in communities each with its separate social, economic, and political structure, its local loyalties, its attention to particular interests.

But we must not think of these communities as being Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and so on, to begin with. They were primarily much smaller and more local, for example, Baghdadi and Mosuli, Damascene and Alepin, Upper Egyptian, Middle Egyptian, Cairene, Deltaic—with a host of other regional communities and often deeply marked subdivisions as well. (Gibb, 1942b, p. 73.)

The political aspect of the situation is stressed in the following:

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The population of almost all 26 political units (in the Middle East) is splintered into a number of minority and tribal groups many with an intense internal loyalty. It is a region of nation against nation, and within one nation, group against group, and cross-cutting nations cooperating groups with stronger loyalties to themselves than to their nation. The national rivalries are similar to those in the Balkans and Ireland. The group conflicts are similar but usually more intense than those in the United States between old Americans and immigrants, Catholics and Protestants, Gentiles and Jews, labor and management, Negroes and whites. And the groups with loyalty cross-cutting national ties are similar though less effective than world Communists. (Richardson and Batal, 1949, p. 483.)

Fisher views the situation from an ecological point of view. He points out (1947, p. 419) that there are three basic ecological groups in the Middle East—nomads, villagers, and city dwellers. The nomads detest the settled people but depend upon them for some of their food. The villagers hate the town and city dwellers because they look upon them as extortioners; yet the city is necessary to

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the village because it provides manufactured goods, and the village supplies the city with food. Fisher concludes:

From these three elements, closely integrated by material and cultural ties, has arisen the present complex pattern of society in the Middle East; and it is on this basis that one can postulate a unity for the region as a whole. As a tapestry or painting owes its special character to an intermingling of diverse color masses, so the Middle East can be conceived as a unity based on a number of distinctive yet related ways of life. (*Ibid.*, p. 420.)

A recent paper by Patai (1952) deals with important aspects of this same topic.

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Coon brings a functional approach to bear on the situation, to which he gives a name, the "mosaic system." His specific view is that the mosaic system is based on an ethnic division of labor:

... the ideal was to emphasize not the uniformity of the citizens of a country as a whole but a uniformity within each special segment, and the greatest possible contrast between segments. The members of each ethnic unit feel the need to identify themselves by some configuration of symbols. If by virtue of their history they possess some racial peculiarity, this they will enhance by special haircuts and the like; in any case they will wear distinctive garments and behave in a distinctive fashion. Walking through the bazaar you have no trouble identifying everyone you meet, once you have learned the sets of symbols. These people want to be identified. If you know who they are, you will know what to expect of them and how to deal with them, and human relations will operate smoothly in a crowded space. ... Obviously the mosaic system is best suited for a civilization in which trades require a maximum of skill, taught from father to son, and a minimum of organizational complexity. (Coon, 1951, pp. 3, 153.)

Coon's interest is primarily in how the mosaic system is made to work in face-to-face contact situations. Such situations, when they involve members of different elements in the mosaic, are generally economic, that is, trade relationships. Economic, or subsistence, needs necessarily override temporarily in any given interaction the divisive pull of intergroup hatred and suspicion. They do, that is, if they are successful and complete transactions. Since most Middle East cities owe their very existence to the fact that they are long-standing trading centers, where members of every element in the mosaic have interacted more or less peaceably, it is clear that group enmities *can* be, and have been for a long time, overridden successfully. But they have not been obliterated; indeed, they maintain their vigor. The fact of the matter seems to be that they can be "forgotten," as it were, only on an individual basis, and temporarily, in the interest of a transitory need, of which successful trade is a prominent example.

David Aberle has come near the point at issue, viewing it as the problem of the "integration of sub-systems with diverse values, within the total social system" (1950, p. 496). In this connection, he points to the coexistence of Catholics,

621 friends. . . . We were made to pay
186 seven gold pounds and a half for the
ticket, while they paid five or six
each. Never mind! Providence will re-
ward them with what they deserve.
. . . . Please let us know about the
health of your children and their
mother, and about our son Deeb and
his mother. Also, let us know how
was the olive crop and how was the
wall case settled. . . ." (Stone walls
are used as fences between pieces of
land property, and have often been
the cause of minor disputes in the
village).

2. Same as above; dated March
14th, 1899.

" . . . As regards L. Milky, he has
sent me two letters so far, asking
for the amount I owe him. I wonder
what has happened to the man! Is he
in such a great need, or is he afraid
that I shall not pay him back the
amount? Please do your best to settle
the affair, and I shall send you the
money soon. . . . Business is bad in
this country at present, and I have
opened a new store which needs all
of my cash money. . . . Dear brother,
please tell me about the house and
our land property, also let me know
what happened to the fig tree which
I planted near the fence wall. . . ."

3. From M. Sarkis to his mother;
Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 29th, 1900.

" . . . Tell me how much it has cost
you to plant the new orchard, and I
shall send you the amount. . . . Is it
true that my brother wants to sell
his share of the land? If so, let me
know how much is the amount, and
I shall send it to you; then you will

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593 ends. May God never bless such a
sister. . . ."

9. From H. to his relative, I. T.
Elias; Penna., August 6th, 1914.

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578 " . . . I have sent you a telegram to
foreclose the land property of N. (a
fellow emigrant). He has refused to
pay me what he owes me or to give
me a mortgage on his land in the vil-
lage. Then he resorted to a mean and
immoral trick. He instigated his wife
to bring a case against me in the
courts, accusing me of assulting her.
He did that with the hope of getting
much money out of me. . . . Don't pay
much attention to the newspapers
cuttings (referring to the case) that
I understand some of our jealous and
mean people here have sent to the
village. In this country, all things,
little and big, are written up in papers,
and nobody pays much attention to
them. . . . Later, N. discontinued the
prosecution of the case and came over
with some of my friends and begged
my pardon. . . ."

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593 10. From S. M. Huleihel (middle
aged woman) to her relative, I. T.
Elias, U. S. A., April 3rd, 1919.

422 " . . . The news of my son's death
has broken my heart and my life. I
don't know what to think or say. He
was my only child. I brought him up
until he was married, and then pre-
vented him from sailing to America,
as I did not want to expose him to
any danger. I sailed away in his place,
and have been laboring for years to
gather some money, on which his
children could grow up comfortably.
. . . He is gone now, and his child is
the only one left for me.

621 it the beginning of a movement that may be
794 termed "progressive." On the other hand, one
621 can see the dangers it implied for village solidarity.
578 A third significant point to observe is that a new
type of conflict arose in the village, as a result of
the school incident. It was conflict between two
new groups—those who wanted to have a Protestant
school in the village and those who opposed
the idea. It was a division that cut across the
family and church groups. It was also conflict
between a traditional value and a new one—
between the need for the preservation of church
integrity and the need for education. All of this
tended to shake the village organization; all of it
demanded new adjustments on the part of the
people.

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871 After the first Mission teacher left the village,
177 his students, and the village people in general, were
191 set afire by the desire for further education.
621 Other mission teachers came to the village and
gave additional impetus to that desire. At the
same time the first emigrants began to return to
the village and tell the people about the wonders
of education in that "marvellous country of
America." English was the language through
which they could attain some status with the
American people and reap some of the gold in that
country. They wanted their children to learn
English and get an American type of education.
The Syrian Protestant College at Beirut was be-
ginning to flourish, and the road was now open for
a village boy to become a doctor or a college
teacher. All of this meant more cash income, and
cash was becoming more and more the significant
symbol of comfort and new forms of prestige.
Village boys and girls began to come back from
Tripoli with American high school certificates in
their hands. They were "fully" educated and
they could share in the establishment and running
of an independent village school.

871 All of these factors combined to bring about the
621 fruition of the village school idea. In 1904, under
the leadership of the Mission's early students and
575 some influential emigrants who had returned to
the village, a fully representative society, the first
in the history of the village, was formed and given
the name of "Raja-el-Watan"—the hope of the
country—the country here meaning nothing more
than the village. The sole aim of the society was to
establish and run a school for the whole village
community.

536 erected, play acting materialized. At first only
517 young men acted. A year or two later, girls
began to act, too. The village could not go
beyond that and allow boys and girls to act
together. That involved kissing and embracing
between boys and girls on the stage, and the village
held to the idea that such a kiss or an intimate
embrace must be reserved to married couples!

834 It is essential that we should dwell briefly on
562 the attitude of the village people towards acting
336 by girls. The villagers had a strong taboo against
578 acting by girls. Acting involved the parading of
the girl on the stage in front of the crowd including
young men and strangers. Remarks might be
made about the girl, causing trouble between her
family and those who made the remarks. Such
parading had the further implication that the
parents were eager to present their girl for mar-
riage. That went against the custom which
demanded that the girl should wait at home until
her suitor came for her. The strongest objection
was due to the fact that the people had always
associated regular actresses with "bad morals."
Gradually, due to the influence of leading families
who were willing to begin with their girls, all of
the above objections were broken down, until
acting by the girls became a matter of course.

536 Within a few years acting became one more
621 established village festival, involving the whole
community. They had been accustomed to re-
ligious village festivals, and it was natural to fit
the play in with the previous pattern and make
of it one more such festival. Without any excep-
tion, everybody—actors, workers, church authori-
ties and leaders—offered his or her services free,
for the community welfare. Over a period of two
months, preparation for the play would engage
the attention of the village with everybody waiting
for the occasion with thrilled anticipation. The
preparation involved the various activities of
casting, renting the equipment from Tripoli,
constructing the stage, evening rehearsals, ener-
getic arguments to persuade a certain girl to accept
a certain role and her parents to permit her to act,
and the distribution of invitations to the neighbor-
ing villages. Two or three days before the play,
the village children would enlist as volunteers who
would go from house to house in the village and
gather all available chairs to seat the guests. The
children's reward was the enjoyment of the activity
itself and free admission during one evening. The
play would be presented for three or four nights.

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made a determined effort to modernize and strengthen their Empire. Two aspects of this effort are of interest here:

(i) The attempt of Abdul-Hamid II to create a new basis of loyalty to the Imam by reviving the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate. Largely this was undertaken as propaganda for external use, to frighten Europe with the threat of a union of Islamic nations under a single head. Partly also, however, it was an attempt to create for the dynasty a place in the hearts of its subjects, in an age in which the dynastic principle was growing weaker. But it was only its orthodox Moslem subjects who could share in this new loyalty; in an Empire based upon Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate there would be no place for Christians, Jews or even heterodox Moslems who rejected the doctrine of the Caliphate.

(ii) The Sultans tried to 'conquer their Empire': to turn it from a group of loosely connected local, racial and religious units into a military and highly centralized state. The means to this end were various: the abolition of feudalism, the creation of an elaborate bureaucracy and provincial administration, the improvement of communications. Among the tasks which were undertaken, an attempt was made to break down the immemorial local autonomies. The feudal and tribal system of the Kurds was gradually broken down from the early decades of the century onwards. On several occasions Kurdish revolts in defence of their autonomy had to be crushed; the last important uprising was that of Badr Khan Bey in the eighteen-forties. The Turcoman and Alawi principalities were subdued in the same way in the middle of the century. Towards the century's close, several attempts were made to establish the Imperial authority over Jebel Druze, but with little effective success in spite of the formal submission of the Druzes.

Lebanese Autonomy

In one instance, however, the new policy of destroying the autonomies was a complete failure. In the nineteenth century the autonomy of Lebanon, far from being destroyed, was strengthened and formalized.

The sectarian character of Lebanon, its desire for autonomy, and its organization under feudal lords and spiritual hierarchies were already well established when the Ottoman Sultans conquered Syria. Although the Mountain recognized the suzerainty

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563 of the Sultan, it preserved its autonomy under hereditary Amirs
578 who paid tribute to the Porte. And although it was frequently
645 afflicted with civil wars, local tyrants and anarchy, it was rarely
[798] if ever torn by sectarian strife, until the period of the Shihab
Amirs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was then
that the rivalry appeared between Maronites and Druzes, which
grew throughout the reign of the great Amir Bashir (1788-1841),
and culminated in the disturbances of 1845 and 1860.

This rivalry was no doubt fed and embittered by religious
differences, but its causes were mainly political and social. In
part they were external to the life of the Mountain: the general
unrest caused by Ibrahim Pasha's invasion of Syria; the inter-
national rivalry between France, which supported the Maronites,
and Great Britain, which supported the Druzes; and the desire
of the Ottoman authorities to weaken the autonomy of the
Mountain by destroying the tradition of religious tolerance on
which it rested. But there were also causes in the Mountain
itself. There was growing unrest among the Maronite peasants
against their feudal landlords, both Maronite and Druze; this
showed itself in North Lebanon in the agrarian revolution of
1857 and the establishment of a short-lived agrarian republic.
More important still, there was a gradual shift in the balance of
the population: the Maronites were spreading southwards into
regions which had formerly been chiefly Druze; the Druzes
were emigrating to the Hauran, and those who were left feared
for their predominance.

In 1860, as the climax of a long period of unrest and growing
hatred, the Druzes of the Mountain and the Moslems of Damascus
killed some thousands of the local Christians. The Powers
intervened, and the result of their intervention was the formaliza-
tion of Lebanese autonomy in the Statute of 1861. This Statute
(which was amended and definitively promulgated in 1864) made
Lebanon into a self-governing Sanjaq, the territory of which
included the Mountain but excluded the larger coastal towns.
It was ruled by a Christian governor, appointed by the Sublime
Porte and assisted by an administrative council representative of
the sects. The Sanjaq had its own fiscal system, its own judiciary
and its own gendarmerie. The Ottoman authorities had practi-
cally no control over its administration.

The system established in 1861 remained in force with no
essential change until the outbreak of the Great War, when the

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Turks abolished the self-government of the Sanjak and subjected it to a regime of repression and starvation. But during the half-century of autonomy, Lebanon enjoyed freedom from civil strife and from Turkish oppression.

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The Egyptian Government

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In Egypt the line of political development was different. Under Muhammad Ali and his successors the country became even more free of control from Istanbul than it had been before. Their rule was comparatively favourable for the minorities. There was a gradual shift from the concept of despotism to that of a nationalism which could include Copts as well as Muslims: and the Copts continued, as before, to hold many positions in the Government. The rulers welcomed foreigners who wished to live and work in the country; Armenians, Syrians and others found an official career open to their talents, and vast opportunities in the commercial and financial life of the country. The dynasty was receptive to Western culture, and under its aegis a veneer of Western ideas and refinement spread over the upper classes at least, but the enlightenment was much less profound than it seemed, and beneath the surface Islamic feeling and hatred of the Christian West continued to be strong.

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When the British occupied Egypt, they carried further certain tendencies begun by the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. They ensured greater freedom of religious thought and expression, greater equality before the law (although still far from complete equality). They opened the country still wider to foreigners, and they made full use of Eastern Christians as government officials: for example Syrian Christians in both the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments, and a small but important group of Armenians, of whom the most famous was Nubar Pasha. But contrary to what might have been expected, they neither attempted to use the Copts as instruments of government nor gave them in any way a privileged position. Individual Copts co-operated with the British, like Butrus Pasha Ghali, but in general there were fewer Coptic officials under the British than there had been in previous periods.

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The Rise of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

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In the second half of the nineteenth century there appeared a new factor, destined to have great effects, for better or for worse,

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LEBANON

Still further evidence is that the French policy of Lebanon and the situation which were added to it by the French to make the Lebanese Republic, and which had formerly been part of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The inhabitants of the former are mainly Maronites, Druzes and Greek Catholics; the latter include Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics in all parts, Armenians in Beirut, Sunnis in the coastal towns, Shi'as in the south and the 'Bijl'. The former have a tradition—a political tradition of autonomy, a social tradition of isolation, a tradition of religious tolerance—which binds them together and which was sufficiently strong to make the autonomous *Sanjaks* function successfully; the latter, however, are not part of the Lebanese tradition and do not possess any common tradition of their own. In addition, at least one of the communities, the Sunnis, and important elements in most of the others, never wanted to be incorporated in Greater Lebanon. The tension between those communities which are part of the real Lebanon and those which are not still continues.

French Policy

A State so deeply divided both in structure and in ideas as the Lebanese Republic and without any unifying national spirit could not continue to exist, at least in its present form, unless there were some external power controlling it closely and interfering continually in its affairs. Until 1943, this external control was provided by the Mandatory Power. Her policy was directed towards making Lebanon a bulwark of French influence. This aim had led to the creation of an independent Lebanon and the extension of its frontiers. It also inspired the attempts to maintain a Christian majority in spite of the extension of the frontiers and the more rapid increase of the Moslem population: this was one of the reasons for the settlement of the Armenian refugees around Beirut. Every attempt was made to attach the Christians more closely to France: by the rapid and systematic spread of French culture, by favouring the Christians in political and administrative matters and by playing upon their fears of Moslem persecution. An analogous appeal was made to the heterodox Moslems, although to a less extent; and even with the Sunnis an attempt was made to Gallicize them by means of education.

Among the Christians preference was given to the Uniates and more particularly to the Maronites, who regarded themselves and were generally regarded as the dominant element in the life of the

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